Pursue American Interests in Ukraine

The United States and Russia have been the two main anchors of the global order for centuries. Throughout history, they have been allies, adversaries, begrudging friends, and belligerent enemies. The main thread in this relationship should have been the pursuit of American interests. In light of current events, one must ask if America is currently pursuing its interests in today’s war in Ukraine.

Writing during World War II, journalist Walter Lippmann begins his chapter on American-Russian relations in U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic with, “We have taken it for granted that we must discover the true American national interest… and if… we fail to find it correctly and to explore its implication exhaustively, our policies will be unworkable in practice because in fact they do not recognize the realities of our position.” He continues to say that “the story of Russian-American relations is an impressive demonstration of how unimportant in the determination of policy is ideology, how compelling is national interest.”

Put more starkly: it does not matter what we, as Americans, think about the type of government that Vladimir Putin leads and embodies in Russia. What matters are the things that are in American interests. Further along he says that “Law… and not power, is the defense of small states. It would seem that the hope of a good settlement on Russia’s western borderlands depends upon whether the border states will adopt a policy of neutralization, and whether Russia will respect and support it. The best interests of the United States would be served by such a solution. It would not bring us or the members of the Atlantic Community into conflict with Russia.”

Lippmann was extremely prescient in this analysis, as we see today with Ukraine. Law was the premise upon which today’s war was assumed to be impossible. Law was the main deterrent that kept Russia in check since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, law has given way to the need for power solely because a policy was pursued that did not rest upon American interests. American policies became unworkable in practice because they failed to recognize the realities of its position. Consequently, what was thought to be a solid foundation built upon law, turned out to be a house of cards that was erroneously built on the overreaching projection of power, and now calls for the physical realization of power to back it up, risking a greater war that Americans do not want.

There have been various reasons given for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Some say he was threatened by NATO’s extension into his next-door neighbors. Others say that Putin would have done this anyway, and that this war is justifying the existence of NATO. Sweden and Finland are currently trying to join NATO, or have joined NATO, and this development is being put up as evidence that NATO is doing its job. Are these developments in America’s best interest? Russia has since already threatened to deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles if these two states do join NATO. Indeed, Russia has now taken the step of deploying nuclear weapons to quasi-puppet-state Belarus. Before we go down a route that is not in American interests, it would be important to recall what Lippmann had to say nearly 80 years ago.

Dutch-American political scientist Nicholas Spykman wrote a piece entitled The Geography of the Peace in 1944, where he said “the United States must recognize once again, and permanently, that the power constellation in Europe and Asia is of everlasting concern to her, both in time of war and in time of peace.” He later said that, “today, we are looking forward to a new peace after the Second World War. The basic issues will remain the same because the geographic factors continue to operate. Balanced power on the Eurasian Continent is one of the objectives for which we are fighting and the establishment of such an equilibrium and its preservation will be our objective when the fight is won… The other two great powers in the world, Russia and Great Britain, will also find their security threatened by the establishment of any hegemony in Europe and Asia. These three states can, therefore, provide the foundation for an effective security system. Since neither of the three can afford to stand alone and isolated against the rest of the world, their co-operation will serve their own best interests.”

One can argue whether it still holds true today that the cooperation of the U.S., U.K., and Russia is required for peace in Europe and Asia, and about whether it is true that the cooperation of these three states serves each of their own interests. But no matter what argument is put forward in these regards, Putin himself has said, “we don’t intend to be isolated. It is impossible to severely isolate anyone in the modern world – especially such a vast country as Russia.”

Putin said this in response to increasingly restrictive economic sanctions by the West. Some argue that the West should continue to pile on as many economic sanctions as possible – that once the world has completely degraded the Russian economy, that Putin will be forced to end the war, either because he is out of resources or because of domestic unrest at home. With the recent “coup” attempt by Prigozhin, the Wagner Group, and allies, it may be that domestic unrest has already come home to roost. However, this completely misreads the situation. As Lippmann and Spykman argued nearly 80 years ago, it is in American interests to ensure that a conflict does not break out with Russia if there is to be peace on the Eurasian continent.

Writing in 1954, Kenneth Waltz writes that states survive in anarchy, and “in anarchy there is no automatic harmony… A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies.” Evidently, Putin looked upon his goals, assessed (incorrectly) his prospects for success, and decided that he valued those goals more than peace. In the international state of anarchy, there was, and is, no way of stopping him from taking this course of action.

Waltz later states a fact of international relations that cannot be forgotten today when deciding upon wise policy regarding Russia: “States have many objects. Some states may aim at the conquest of the world, other states may aim at a local hegemony, other states may aim at no hegemony at all but desire simply to be left alone. Common to the desires of all states is the wish for survival… If all states wanted simply to survive, then none would need to maintain military forces for use in either defensive or offensive action. But whenever some states give the impression that survival does not exhaust their political ambitions, others are forced, logically, to look to their defenses.”

Waltz’s statement can, of course, cut in either direction. What is Putin aiming at and, maybe more importantly, what does Putin think NATO and the West are aiming at? It becomes difficult to untangle all the threads that constitute the answers to these questions. However, still be put in a position that acts in American interests. In this sense, it does not matter that the West believes NATO is only a defensive alliance that serves American interests. What matters more is how does Putin perceive this alliance? If Russia’s definition of an entity is different than the West’s definition of that same entity, then the costs of all scenarios must be weighed, and policy must be conformed as necessary so that it plays out to a best-case scenario for American interests.

So, which is better for American interests? An alliance that is seen as a threat by Russia, or the tampering down of that alliance to not make a bigger mess than what has been bargained for? If the answer is the former – which so far it has been – then you risk unwanted entanglement. Continuing down this path will only lead to greater conflict and would not be in American interests. This was the situation foretold nearly 80 years ago by the authors cited above. If the answer is the latter, then America must pursue a path that leads back to the situation that has staved off major war in Europe and Asia since World War II.

Worryingly, the tide seems to be moving in the opposite direction. As of July 9, 2023, the U.S. has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to Ukraine. Further, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan confirmed on July 7, 2023, that the U.S. will send cluster munitions to Ukraine, weapons that fall over a wide area and that have a high chance of failing to explode, blowing up beneath unsuspecting civilians years or decades later.

Those looking for a peaceful solution to this crisis must look to the past to learn what has already taken place in similar situations, and they would be wise not to repeat the mistakes of the Cold War. The pursuit of American interests must be in the forefront of any policy decisions that are taken regarding Russia. This is even more important now in the aftermath of what seems to be a coup attempt because of Putin’s increasing isolation and paranoia. The world cannot afford another debacle like the Cuban Missile Crisis. This time it could, horrifyingly, play through to its foreordained end.

Sam Fouad is an editor at RCDefense, and a PhD candidate at The Catholic University of America. 

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.