Syria After Assad: A Test of U.S. Restraint in an Unraveling Region
The resignation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his flight into the protective embrace of Russia is no mere footnote in the annals of Middle Eastern history. It is a seismic event, a fulcrum upon which the fragile equilibrium of the region now tilts. Assad, the iron-fisted autocrat who presided over one of the bloodiest civil wars of the 21st century, has left Damascus in disarray. Yet, while his departure might appear as an opening act for long-awaited stability, it is just as likely the prelude to a darker, more chaotic chapter. For the United States, the moment demands restraint and the wisdom to avoid being ensnared in Syria’s labyrinthine conflicts.
Assad’s exit is not simply the removal of a man; it is the unmooring of a regime that for decades maintained order through brutal repression and patronage networks that threaded through Syria’s deeply fractured society. His absence creates a power vacuum in a nation where sectarian divides run deep, and factions sharpen their knives at the faintest scent of opportunity. Opposition groups, Kurdish forces, remnants of the Assad regime, and extremist actors like ISIS are all poised to contest the spoils. To imagine that the end of Assad’s reign heralds the rise of a stable and democratic Syria is to indulge in the most dangerous of fantasies. The structural rot—sectarianism, corruption, and shattered governance—remains.
The United States, burned by its previous entanglements in the Middle East, must tread lightly. Interventionists may view Assad’s departure as a chance to mold Syria in the image of the West, but such hubris has already plunged the region into disaster time and again. Instead, Washington must show a steadier hand. Syria does not need another crusader charging in with lofty ideals and little understanding of its complexities. What it requires is space—space for the region to heal, for its factions to negotiate, and for diplomacy to prevail over the barrel of a gun.
Assad’s retreat to Russia is no accident of geography or circumstance. It is a calculated move by Moscow, a clear statement that it remains the region’s indispensable power broker. By hosting Assad, Vladimir Putin secures Russia’s foothold in Syria, including its cherished naval and airbases, and solidifies its role as a patron to other embattled autocrats who fear Western intervention. This, of course, poses a dilemma for the United States: Should it seek to counter Russia’s influence in Syria? The answer, if guided by restraint and realism, is an emphatic no. Washington’s obsession with confronting Russia in every theater has cost it dearly, both in resources and credibility. Syria must not become another battleground in a new Cold War. Let Moscow bear the burden of propping up its client state while the U.S. focuses on securing its own interests.
If Assad’s departure shakes Moscow, it outright stuns Tehran. Iran, Assad’s steadfast ally, has spent billions propping up his regime, entrenching militias, and weaving a web of influence from Damascus to Beirut. Without Assad, Tehran faces a formidable challenge in maintaining its land corridor to Hezbollah and the Mediterranean. Some in Washington will salivate at the thought of Iran’s discomfort, viewing it as a moment to strike and dismantle its regional network. Yet, the prudent course is one of engagement, not escalation. This is a chance to pressure Tehran into reducing its ambitions in Syria while extending an olive branch—perhaps through economic incentives or diplomatic overtures—to encourage a gradual retreat rather than a dramatic showdown.
Turkey, too, finds itself in a precarious position. While Ankara might welcome Assad’s fall as the elimination of an old foe, it will not tolerate the emergence of a Kurdish statelet on its southern border. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambitions to neutralize Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria could trigger renewed military incursions, plunging the region into further instability. The United States, long caught between its NATO ally Turkey and its Kurdish partners in the fight against ISIS, must resist the temptation to pick a side. Instead, it should play the role of mediator, urging Ankara and Kurdish leaders toward compromise while ensuring that no single actor dominates the post-Assad vacuum.
The Gulf Arab states—Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular—see in Assad’s resignation both opportunity and peril. They may seek to extend their influence in Syria as a counterweight to Iran, using financial clout and political leverage to shape the country’s future. However, their moves are unlikely to align seamlessly with U.S. interests, and Washington should be wary of endorsing their ambitions uncritically. Support for Gulf-led stabilization efforts should be limited and conditional, encouraging their involvement without becoming entangled in their rivalries.
For Europe, the specter of Assad’s departure raises immediate and painful questions about refugees and reconstruction. The continent still bears the scars of the 2015 migrant crisis, and a new wave of displaced Syrians could reignite political fissures. Meanwhile, the staggering cost of rebuilding Syria looms on the horizon, with no clear answer as to who will foot the bill. The United States, while offering humanitarian aid, must not allow itself to be drawn into the mire of nation-building. Reconstruction is a task best left to multilateral institutions and regional stakeholders, with Washington playing a supporting, not leading, role.
And what of the United States itself? Assad’s resignation presents an undeniable temptation to reassert American influence in Syria. Interventionists will argue that now, more than ever, is the time to shape the region’s destiny. But such calls should be met with skepticism. Every American foray into the Middle East has been accompanied by soaring rhetoric and disastrous outcomes. From Iraq to Libya, the lesson is clear: The United States cannot solve the Middle East’s problems through force or fiat.
Instead, America must practice the virtue of patience. It must prioritize its core interests—preventing the resurgence of ISIS, protecting its allies, and containing threats to its homeland—while allowing regional actors to take the lead in Syria’s stabilization. It should support European partners diplomatically and provide humanitarian assistance where possible, but it must resist the siren song of deep involvement.
Assad’s resignation is a watershed moment, but it is not an American moment. It is a chance for Washington to demonstrate that power is not measured by the number of conflicts one engages in but by the ability to exercise restraint when the stakes demand it. Let Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf states shoulder the burden of Syria’s future. Let Europe address the challenges of refugees and reconstruction. And let the United States stand as a cautious observer, ready to act when its interests demand it but wise enough to hold back when they do not.
This is not retreat. It is the disciplined application of realism, a recognition that the Middle East’s fate does not rest solely on Washington’s shoulders. In Syria, as in much of the world, the United States must learn to lead not by intervention, but by example. In the ashes of Assad’s reign lies an opportunity—not to rebuild an empire, but to show the power of restraint in a world too often drunk on hubris.
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with DefensePriorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
