Grand Strategy – Restrainers vs. Primacists
When It Comes to U.S. Grand Strategy, the Restrainers Are Spot on and the Primacists Are Dead Wrong
The recent United Nations Security Council vote on Russia and Ukraine has once again thrust U.S. grand strategy into the spotlight. Predictably, Washington’s foreign policy establishment responded with familiar alarmism. Compounding the noise, President Donald Trump and his team have issued new pronouncements on America’s strategic posture, doubling down on their calls for greater burden-sharing among allies, skepticism toward endless wars, and a reassessment of long-standing alliances like NATO. Critics, as expected, wasted no time labeling these positions reckless and isolationist. But much of this criticism is less about the substance of Trump’s views and more about a moral panic rooted in Trump himself. His unorthodox style and rhetoric provoke knee-jerk reactions that cloud the deeper strategic logic at play. Although I am not an across-the-board supporter of Trump—I have strong reservations about much of his domestic agenda and political style—I am a passionate advocate for a grand strategy of restraint. Not because Trump champions it, but because restraint is the only approach consistent with the post-unipolar, multipolar world we now inhabit.
Restraint should never be mistaken for isolationism. The critics’ lazy conflation of the two is a disservice to strategic debate. Restraint does not mean withdrawing from the world or abandoning allies. Rather, it requires strategic discipline – prioritizing vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere and key regions of Eurasia, while avoiding costly, unnecessary interventions. The Western Hemisphere, in particular, deserves renewed focus as the bedrock of U.S. security. Strengthening regional ties, stabilizing fragile states, and preventing external interference in the Americas would ensure a secure backyard from which the U.S. can project power when essential. Yet, this hemispheric emphasis does not mean ignoring revisionist powers in other regions. Balancing and blunting threats elsewhere remains crucial when regional hegemony would jeopardize core U.S. interests. As multipolarity replaces the fleeting moment of unipolarity, the reality is clear: the United States cannot – and should not – attempt to sustain a unipolar moment that has long since passed.
The critique from primacists – those who insist the United States must pursue global dominance to preserve an American-centric international order – is not merely flawed; it is soaked in anti-Trump hysteria. This hysteria renders their argument more hyper-partisan political grandstanding than practical geopolitical theory or implementable strategic vision. Trump’s foreign policy instincts, while sometimes inelegantly expressed, reflect key elements of the restraint vision: not trying to police an increasingly ghostly rules-based international order; questioning reckless military interventions intended to uphold that order, expecting more from allies, focusing on hemispheric stability, and recognizing China as the principal long-term competitor. These positions merit thoughtful engagement, regardless of one’s opinion of Trump or his MAGA team. The primacist establishment dismisses them reflexively, conflating sound strategic arguments with the political figurehead delivering them. This reflexive dismissal misses the broader strategic significance. As a proponent of restraint, I am sympathetic to Trump’s strategic instincts not because they are his but because they align with today’s geopolitical realities.
Much of the misunderstanding arises from the enduring fiction of a “rules-based international order.” Primacists cling to this concept, asserting it demands unending U.S. leadership. In truth, this so-called order has always been selectively applied – more aspirational than real. More critically, it is now in terminal decline. The rise of regional powers and a diffuse distribution of global power ensure that no single state can impose its will without incurring unacceptable costs. Restrainers understand this reality. Washington must adjust, focusing on blunting revisionist ambitions where it truly matters. In East Asia, this means balancing China’s rise alongside regional partners. In Europe, capable allies must assume greater responsibility for deterring Russia, with the U.S. playing a supportive, not leading, role. Meanwhile, safeguarding hemispheric security remains a central pillar. Latin America and the Caribbean’s stability directly influences U.S. economic prosperity and domestic security.
Some critics point to Trump’s so-called softness on Russia as proof of dangerous isolationism. This, too, misses the mark. As The Wall Street Journal recently noted, Trump’s approach to Russia is hardly unprecedented. Previous administrations, including Obama’s, sought pragmatic engagement with Moscow when U.S. interests aligned. Restraint here does not mean appeasement; it means realism. Recognizing that antagonizing Russia on its doorstep risks unnecessary confrontation is strategic wisdom, not weakness. Europe is economically and technologically equipped to handle its own security. Overcommitting U.S. resources in Europe, especially when strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and hemispheric challenges loom large, is shortsighted.
Trump’s approach, particularly toward Russia, reveals a continuity in U.S. foreign policy that many refuse to acknowledge. Critics frame his policies as dangerous departures, yet they fit squarely within a pragmatic tradition prioritizing American interests over ideological crusades. Emphasizing the Western Hemisphere reinforces this tradition by securing regions most consequential to U.S. security. The critics’ reactionary dismissal says more about their discomfort with a changing geopolitical landscape than about the soundness of restraint.
Restraint rejects the outdated fantasy of global hegemony desperately clung to by far too many in the US foreign policy establishment. The misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan stand as stark reminders of the perils of overreach – trillions of dollars squandered, countless lives lost, and U.S. credibility severely undermined. Primacists argue that America must lead everywhere to prevent chaos. History proves otherwise. It is American overextension, not strategic discipline, that has often fueled global instability. Multipolarity is an inescapable reality. No level of American resolve can restore a unipolar world. Restraint embraces this truth, offering a sustainable path forward – one that secures America’s strategic backyard while ensuring flexibility to confront genuine threats abroad.
Although Trump’s foreign policy pronouncements lack polish – and here I’m being charitable – his instincts nevertheless reflect the new geopolitical realities. Where his critics see chaos, restrainers see a long-overdue course adjustment. If institutionalized and refined, these instincts could form the backbone of a coherent grand strategy – one that balances threats, blunts revisionist ambitions when and where essential, and concentrates U.S. power where it matters most. As scholars at Defense Priorities and the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy consistently argue, such a pragmatic approach offers the best chance of securing U.S. interests in a multipolar era.
In the end, critiques of restraint are stale and unconvincing. They stem more from fear – of Trump, of change, of multipolarity – than from rational strategic analysis. Restraint does not represent a diminished vision of America’s role in the world. On the contrary, it is a practical, sustainable, and strategically agile response to today’s shifting geopolitical terrain. Washington’s path forward should embrace restraint – not as a reluctant fallback, but as the most effective course for navigating an increasingly complex world, where hemispheric security forms the indispensable foundation for broader strategic success.
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with Defense Priorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
