China’s Tech Triple Play Threatens U.S. National Security
Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping has defiantly declared that technological innovation is the “main battlefield” in China’s quest for global preeminence. But, Beijing’s bold bid to transform itself into a global science superpower is not merely an economic imperative—it is a means to strengthen China’s military might and cyber capabilities, with grave implications for the United States.
At the center of Xi’s vision are what he calls China’s “new productive forces”—breakthroughs in advanced batteries, biotech, LiDAR, drones, and other emerging technologies that promise to redefine the next industrial revolution. By dominating these sectors, Beijing aims to ensure Chinese technology is deeply embedded within critical American supply chains—everything from power grids and ports to communications networks —thereby converting China’s commercial success into a powerful geopolitical tool of leverage.
Here at home, Beijing’s strategy is unfolding in three interlocking phases—penetrating, prepositioning, and profiting—which together form an insidious framework that both erodes America’s technological edge and undermines homeland security.
Recently exposed Chinese state-sponsored hacking campaigns—Salt, Volt, and Flax Typhoon—exemplify Beijing’s systematic approach to penetrating U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. The Salt campaign exploited vulnerabilities in telecommunications systems, allowing attackers to intercept voice and text communications and thereby compromise both civilian privacy and government operations. The Volt operation targeted industrial control systems, breaching energy and manufacturing networks to gain remote control over essential infrastructure. Meanwhile, Flax Typhoon focused on defense and government networks, exfiltrating sensitive data and installing persistent backdoors to facilitate future sabotage.
Collectively, these campaigns reveal how Chinese hackers methodically exploit software and hardware weaknesses to harvest critical intelligence and maintain enduring access to sensitive U.S networks, often with next-to-no consequences. Yet infiltration is not an end in itself. Once inside, Beijing systematically prepositions latent capabilities throughout our physical and digital supply chains, setting the stage for future coercion.
Today, Chinese-made LiDAR devices underpin smart city systems, autonomous vehicles, and certain aerial reconnaissance platforms. Similarly, Chinese-produced surveillance cameras and drones are integrated throughout our transportation network, including at major U.S. airports. Even critical infrastructure components like cranes in U.S. ports and batteries connected to our grids have morphed into strategic choke points, according to Congressional investigations.
In a conflict—or even a severe diplomatic crisis—these systemic dependencies could confer a decisive advantage to China. By withholding critical parts or inflating prices at a pivotal moment, Beijing can exploit these supply chain choke points to hamper U.S. readiness.
Prepositioned exploits could degrade or disable U.S. command-and-control systems, sabotage energy grids, or paralyze transportation networks—potentially stalling America’s response before a single shot is fired. Even if such disruptions remain hypothetical, the mere suspicion of sabotage can erode policymaker confidence and delay military mobilization efforts, effectively handing Beijing a silent veto over our crisis decision-making.
The final phase of Beijing’s strategy is profiting from these dependencies, turning commercial dominance into a revenue stream that reinforces its military-civil fusion. Chinese high-tech exports, ranging from advanced sensors and biotech innovations to drones and surveillance cameras, generate billions in revenue every year for Beijing. These profits are not reinvested merely for commercial growth; they are often funneled directly into programs bolstering People’s Liberation Army’s R&D efforts.
The stakes could hardly be higher. The House Homeland Security Committee, along with other congressional panels, has convened hearings spotlighting how Chinese hackers sit in vital infrastructure systems and how Beijing’s infiltration extends into our supply chains. The bipartisan consensus emerging from these discussions is clear: we must move swiftly from passive defense of American networks to proactive deterrence.
Policymakers can begin by tightening outbound investment screening and export controls. That means scrutinizing U.S. capital and technology flows into Chinese firms linked to China’s military-industrial base, ensuring that American money and know-how no longer subsidize Beijing’s military modernization. Simultaneously, federal agencies should adopt ‘clean network’ standards for software, hardware, and data, effectively establishing cyber quarantines for critical infrastructure. This would bar high-risk Chinese devices from power grids, ports, and telecommunications systems—treating them as inherently untrusted until proven otherwise.
Equally important is imposing meaningful consequences on Beijing’s cyber intrusions. Diplomatic protests and token indictments of mid-level hackers have failed to alter China’s calculus. Instead, Washington should consider stronger penalties—including financial blacklisting of major Chinese firms or banks—to send an unmistakable message that continued infiltration carries real costs.
Finally, we must commit to robust innovation at home. America can’t meet the Chinese challenge simply by playing defense. Expanding federal R&D, incentivizing private-sector breakthroughs, and aligning workforce development with future technology needs will ensure that the United States remains a leader in the very fields—biotech, AI, quantum computing, energy storage—where China seeks supremacy.
Xi’s “main battlefield” is already upon us, and America can no longer afford complacency. China’s triple threat—penetrating, prepositioning, and profiting—targets the core of our national resilience. If we fail to respond decisively, we risk losing our technological edge and compromising our security. By fortifying our networks, enforcing meaningful consequences on malicious actors, and investing in American innovation, we can ensure Xi’s ambitions do not come at the expense of our prosperity and safety.
Craig Singleton, a former U.S. diplomat, currently serves as a senior fellow at the non-partisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
