Who Wants The Iran War To Continue, And Why?
To understand why Saudi Arabia and Israel are urging Trump not to relent on Iran it is important to understand the military term “pursuit phase”.
Pursuit is the phase which follows a breakthrough designed to catch or cut off a hostile force that is attempting to escape (retrograde), with the aim of destroying it before it can reorganize or establish a new defensive position. It begins when the enemy breaks contact and tries to withdraw, often after losing cohesion.
Pursuit is often one of the most decisive and destructive phases for the enemy when executed effectively, because the retreating force is highly vulnerable. It’s the payoff phase. To achieve a breakthrough only to call off pursuit is basically to let Blofeld escape in the final reel so there’ll be a sequel.
When pursuit becomes impossible or severely restricted due to sanctuary (safe havens across borders or in ungoverned spaces) or international law/political constraints, it fundamentally undermines the decisive potential of this offensive phase.
The most prominent examples of denied pursuit are the Korean War, Vietnam and Afghanistan. In each case sanctuary was the limiting factor. When military pursuit is deliberately prevented by political leaders’ desire to limit the war and avoid broadening the conflict, it represents a classic tension between tactical/operational opportunities and strategic/political constraints.
This approach stems from “limited war” theory, where objectives are deliberately capped to prevent escalation—particularly against adversaries backed by major powers, nuclear risks, or fragile international coalitions. It is deemed too dangerous to win.
Basically the dilemma is summarized by the imperative of negotiated settlement over decision: if you win then who will you negotiate with?
Pursuit has its perils but limited war has dangers that should also be mentioned. It emphasizes mitigation over resolution. The Global World Order was in this sense misnamed. It didn’t grow from a plan but from overlapping patches. A friend of mine described how we got here:
“Instead of building on the strategic architecture that had delivered victory in the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy became increasingly transactional, reactive, and threat-centric. We responded to provocations from Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. We changed regimes, built coalitions, and launched interventions. But we did so without a coherent vision of the world we sought to build.
This improvisational posture defined more by tactical urgency than strategic clarity has yielded a fragmented legacy. Our global footprint today is not the result of deliberate design; it is the sum of threats we’ve mitigated, crisis we’ve managed, and adversaries we’ve countered.”
Perhaps it is significant that the Islamic Republic did not think regime change was undesirable or unachievable. It was their goal in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and Yemen. The difference was that unlike the West the IR had a plan.
