Facing What We See in the Mirror: America Hasn’t Won Our Wars

Nelson’s article was apparently occasioned by a December 9^th tweet from former Navy SEAL and current Member of Congress Derrick Van Orden that the United States has “not won a war in over 80 years.”  In fact, a number of scholars and military thinkers have made similar arguments (even if most put the first Gulf War into the “win” category). Dan Bolger’s book Why We Lost, Donald Stoker’s book Why America Loses Wars, James Warren’s book Outmaneuvered:  America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan, and this author’s Parameters article “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” all attempt to understand a historical phenomenon Nelson believes to be a fallacy: “that the American military doesn’t win wars.”

Nelson’s argument rests on three pillars:  Americans are ignorant about what war is, ignorant about how often we fight wars, and ignorant about the outcomes of the wars we fight. All three statements are unfair to the people whom Nelson repeatedly risked his life to defend. In point of fact, the American people have a visceral sense about what constitutes a war, understand that some wars are more important than others (as Nelson apparently does not; neither in the political science literature nor in any other way is it true that “Grenada is just as much of a war as World War II”); and most importantly, know that we lost catastrophically in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three of the five biggest wars of the past eighty years.  With a win in Desert Storm and a tie in Korea, that makes our record since World War II a resounding one, three, and one—as I noted in Parameters, a result that “would have landed any football coach in the hot seat—if it did not get the coach fired midseason.”

The causes for our defeats are varied, but revolve around three recurring factors:  an inability to understand the history, culture, and politics of the countries in which we were fighting; a failure to prepare for the peace that follows the fighting that is, as Saint Augustine taught, the only reason to fight a war in the first place; and excessive belief in our ability to accomplish political tasks through the use of arms.  There is terrific and voluminous writing on each of these failings, including Montgomery McFate and Janice Laurence’s Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan, David Fitzgerald’s Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq and Jeremy Kasper’s Forgetting How to Win: The U.S. Army, State Department, and USAID in Modern Post-Combat Operations.  All begin their valuable examination of lessons learned from recent conflicts by doing exactly what Nelson tells us not to do:  admitting our failures, especially in Iraq.

After decrying the ignorance of the American people and equating the importance of Grenada with that of World War II, Nelson baldly states that “Iraq was a victory — a poorly decided, stupidly managed, and possibly counterproductive in the long-term victory.”  I am with him on the subordinate clauses: Iraq was certainly decided on false pretenses; stupidly managed with insufficient troops to secure the peace and no plan for who would rule the country after Saddam Hussein was deposed; and almost certainly counterproductive, costing the United States three trillion dollars (and counting) while taking perhaps 500,000 lives and increasing the relative power of Iran in the Middle East (at least prior to Israel and America’s recent strikes on the country).  But stating that Iraq was a victory is simply not true if the word victory is to have any meaning.

Nelson admits that his interpretation of the recent war in Iraq is controversial, calling it an “example of a misunderstood success” and stating that “[w]hen viewed in this prism, the United States military has myriad successes since World War II.”  When viewed through a similar prism, I am 6’2”, bench press 325 pounds and play quarterback for the Kansas City Chiefs; the prism through which Nelson understands Iraq distorts reality beyond the point of recognition. In the Pulitzer-Prize nominated book Fiasco, Tom Ricks notes that the American invasion of Iraq may well be the most profligate act in American history; if Iraq was a victory for the United States, we certainly cannot afford any defeats.

Nelson served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan; I understand his desire to have that service and the sacrifices he and his soldiers made have enduring value.  America’s failures in the wars in which he served are not his fault nor the fault of his soldiers, but they are failures, nonetheless. The best way to honor the sacrifices so many Americans made in Iraq and Afghanistan is to examine the reasons why American efforts to achieve political results through the use of force failed—why America lost the wars in which Nelson fought. As we have learned about defeating alcoholism, the first step is admitting that we have a problem.

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John Nagl is the General John J. Pershing Chair of Military Strategy at the Army War College and the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and Knife Fights:  A Memoir of Modern War.  He served in tank units in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These are his own views and not those of the United States Army War College or the United States Army.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.