Avoiding Occupational Hazards: Applying the Weinberger Doctrine to Regime Change
The history of U.S. regime changes and occupations is replete with failures and only a few successes. So, what is the solution? No more Iraqs, Libyas, and Afghanistans? The Weinberger Doctrine and the U.S.-led regime changes in Germany, Japan, and Panama provide two important lessons: first, there must be a vital U.S. interest to justify the high cost of occupation. Second, when attempted, the U.S. should make an intense, costly, whole-of-government effort to see occupation to a successful end. Absent a U.S. national consensus and the necessary preparation to occupy and govern a country, the U.S. would be wise to avoid putting boots on the ground. Following are five principles for U.S. leaders to consider regarding regime change and occupation:
1. Military victory today does not necessarily translate into long-term political success
The U.S. has successfully executed regime changes three times in the last 25 years: Mullah Omar of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 2011. None of these interventions resulted in the desired U.S. political outcomes such as stable governments that respect for human rights and the rule of law. Afghanistan is back in the hands of the Taliban following 20 years of U.S. occupation. Iraq continues to struggle with ISIL and Iranian-aligned militia groups. Libya has only recently achieved a fragile peace after almost a decade of conflict.
2. Occupation is a long, resource intense game – count the cost and be ready to make the sacrifice
Going in “light” and “surgical” – as was done in all three cases mentioned above – does work to take down a dictator. U.S. air superiority, precision munitions, intelligence gathering, and cyber warfare against non-peer competitors are effective. There is no doubt that the U.S. has the power to put “boots on the ground” almost anywhere in the world and effect regime change in most cases. That said, going in light does not facilitate long-term success, as evidenced by the need for “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to large-scale insurgent violence by the ousted rulers in those countries.
These cases point to the likelihood of the U.S. needing to deploy large numbers of troops for extended periods of time to “clear, hold, and build” in order to stabilize and transform a dictatorship into a democracy. To occupy even moderate size countries, the U.S. would need to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops in order to meet the Counterinsurgency Field Manual’s recommended minimum of 20 troops per 1,000 people. Given its current commitments in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. is not currently prepared to deploy this size of an occupation force without significant costs to readiness in other theaters.
In terms of time required, a RAND study of U.S. nation building published in 2003 found that “while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.” The most successful occupations in Germany and Japan lasted 10 and 7 years, respectively, and those relationships evolved into ongoing partnerships that continue with U.S. military presence to this day.
As for resources, one estimate places U.S. costs from Afghanistan and Iraq (including on-going costs to treat those injured) at between $4-6 trillion. Iraq’s and Libya’s oil did not cover U.S. occupation costs – despite claims that they would – and so the U.S. must be ready to pay a large financial price in order to transform a society.
Lastly, the human cost has also been vast. Official government sources place U.S. casualties across Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya at 6,836 dead and 53,004 wounded – many of whom suffer with lifelong impacts to them and their families. Afghan, Iraqi, and Libyan casualties are much higher and not as well documented. Most sources agree that thousands of Libyans have been killed since 2011 and that hundreds of thousands of Afghans and Iraqis have been killed since U.S. interventions began there.
The last 25 years demonstrate that occupation of another country has proven costly for the occupier and the occupied people. Future occupations are not likely to be different and the burden of proof rests on those who claim otherwise.
3. Foreign occupiers struggle with legitimacy, the key to political success
The historical record is full of foreign occupiers – including superpowers – getting beaten by militarily inferior locals: American insurgents defeating the British during the American Revolution; Algerian resistance to the French; Vietnamese resistance to the Japanese, French, and then the Americans; Afghan resistance to the British, Soviets, and Americans, etc. Some have argued that in the long-term such foreigners can never win against local insurgents because they inherently lack legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is not to say that all insurgencies win. Many have failed when they brutalized the local people and lost popular support (e.g., Al Qaida in Iraq in 2007-2008).
The alternative to a long, foreign occupation is to quickly hand off to an organized democratic opposition, as was done successfully in Panama. The problem is that, as in post-WWII Germany and post-Saddam Iraq, such a legitimate, organized group often does not exist. The alternative is a double bind: the occupier can either try to co-opt members of the former regime as was done in West Germany (despite the narrative of denazification, many former Nazis served in significant political and economic positions), with the moral and political implications of aligning with such forces, or the occupier can assume responsibility and run the occupation itself, with all the political and material costs discussed above. The worst solution would be to remove the regime without a clear successor and hope for the best, as was done in Iraq in 2003.
4. There must be a compelling U.S. interest to justify the cost of occupation
The first key aspect of the Weinberger Doctrine is that the U.S. should only go to war (or in this case, to occupy) when there is a vital U.S. interest at stake. The combination of the heavy cost of occupation (time, money, blood) to the occupier and the natural resistance to foreign occupation by the occupied people mean that few occupations lasted long enough to be successful. A key to overcoming these “occupational hazards” is the presence of an external threat that motivates the occupier to stay longer and the occupied people to value the presence of the occupier. After WWII, the U.S. was willing to stay and invest in rebuilding a democratic West Germany because they wanted to prevent the rise of another fascist regime and stop Soviet expansion into Western Europe. The West Germans did not like the U.S. occupation, but they observed the harsh Soviet occupation of East Germany and valued American protection to prevent that from happening to them. The same dynamic occurred in Japan after WWII (to avoid Soviet occupation) and South Korea following the Korean War (to avoid North Korean/Chinese domination).
Obviously, a compelling Cold War-esque external threat that would sufficiently motivate the U.S. to invest the necessary time, blood, and treasure to occupy a country cannot be manufactured. Similarly, without a compelling external threat, the local occupied people will quickly tire of and likely begin resisting the U.S. presence, especially if the occupation is seen as heavy handed.
5. If attempted, the President needs to enforce unity of command supported by a well-prepared, whole-of-government effort – occupation as a “pickup game” rarely turns out well for anyone
The second key aspect of the Weinberger Doctrine, after a decision has been made to intervene, is to do so wholeheartedly. This requires a whole-of-government effort led by the U.S. military.
Within the U.S. government, the military is the only organization with the necessary operational mindset, sufficient deployable personnel, and the ability to protect itself while performing the key governance tasks of securing the population and maintaining a monopoly on violence. While there is much more to governance than security, it is the sine qua non of successful occupations.
The State Department, while highly skilled at diplomacy, lacks deployable personnel and the operational mindset necessary to govern a country. This is not to say that the U.S. military should run occupations by itself. Other U.S. government departments and agencies, partner countries, and non-governmental organizations have crucial contributions to make to stabilization, reconstruction, and governance efforts and should be included in the planning process from the outset as part of the interagency process but the military should be in the lead with final decisional authority.
The absence of unity of command and of a whole of government effort were core issues in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority did not have the resources and authority to actually take charge, particularly over U.S. Central Command. Due to bureaucratic infighting, the DoD refused to utilize expertise from the State Department’s Future of Iraq project (which had done extensive planning and preparation for governance and reconstruction) and minimized usage of other agencies, preferring to rely on its own reservists. The results were missed opportunities that contributed to sectarian civil war and the formation of ISIL.
Planning and preparation were keys to success historically. Following an unforeseen and difficult occupation of the Rhineland at the end of World War I, leaders within the U.S. Army determined that the U.S. would be prepared for such operations in the future. As World War II loomed, they created military occupation doctrine, started a School of Military Governance, and trained thousands of civil affairs officers. Their planning and preparation contributed to the great success of U.S. occupations of Italy, Germany, and Japan.
Conclusion
In summary, the United States should adopt a Weinberger Doctrine approach to regime change and occupation: only attempt as a last resort when there is a compelling U.S. security interest and then dedicate the necessary planning, time, material, and human resources to be successful. The U.S. regime changes of the last 25 years struggled and failed because they did not follow these principles. The solution in the short term is for the U.S. to avoid regime change and occupation and in the long-term to develop and prepare the capabilities across the entire U.S. government to successfully occupy and transform a society when called upon to do so.
R.W. “Woody” Olmstead teaches American Government and International Security at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, or the U.S. Government.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
